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ROOTS OF CONFLICT IN SOLOMON ISLANDS 
THOUGH MUCH IS TAKEN, MUCH ABIDES: 
LEGACIES OF TRADITION AND COLONIALISM
JUDITH 
BENNETT
For many outsiders, the accelerating failure 
of governments in western Melanesia in the 
last decade has been difficult to understand. 
At independence, though their resources ranged 
from the rich diversity in Papua New Guinea 
to the less abundant, but still substantial 
in Solomon Islands, it seemed that with 
goodwill and some temporary assistance from 
developed nations in the region their future 
would be assured. Yet since independence, 
overall Melanesian living standards and personal 
security have declined; and more and more aid is 
being requested from donors.
This essay seeks to answer the questions, 
“What went wrong in Solomon Islands? Why 
was the government overthrown in mid 2000? 
Why did civil war erupt mainly between 
Guadalcanal and Malaitan people?” The answers 
are to be found partly in recent regional and 
global factors that have impacted this state since 
independence, such as the Bougainville conflict, 
the fall in commodity prices in the 1980s, 
and the burgeoning of Neo-Classical economics 
in the West. More significant, however, are 
the deeper structures and patterns of the more 
distant past. This essay will first examine 
the nature of traditional Solomons’ societies 
and how these operated at the local level, 
the significance of local identity, and other 
enduring Melanesian values that continue to 
influence politics. The nature of Christianity 
and colonialism will next be considered 
because these have also left their mark, often 
changing the balance of population-resource 
ratios, encouraging greater mobility and raising 
expectations that have fostered dependence on 
global economic linkages. Regional expressions 
of social, economic and political ways and 
means emerged both before and after the 
Second World War, but these indigenous protest 
movements largely collapsed in the face of the 
colonial government’s opposition. 
This essay argues that independent 
governments have not fulfilled the aspirations 
they represented. Though Christianity in its 
various forms has become more naturalised, the 
political structures bequeathed by the British are 
foreign additions that have not sat well on the 
Melanesian foundation. Yet Solomon Islander 
politicians in the years since independence 
have done no more than tinker with them, 
because they have given such men a degree of 
personal power in the disposal of resources. The 
incongruities and failure of these structures to 
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deliver good governance peaked in 2000, with 
conflict between the Guadalcanal and Malaitan 
militias. These incongruities remain still, in 
spite of some propping up of the semblance of 
government by interested outside nations and 
donor bodies.
TRADITIONAL SOLOMON ISLANDS 
SOCIETY
In order to understand the present Solomon 
Islands we need to look to the past and the 
nature of society and place. We may talk 
of Solomons Islands as having become an 
independent state in 1978, but all this is very 
recent, as is any sense of national identity. The 
very name of the archipelago was given by a 
foreigner, Mendaña in the sixteenth century. 
His blanket term however, did not reflect the 
inherent unity of its peoples. In Mendaña’s 
eyes, the only thing the peoples seemed to 
have in common was their desire to have the 
hungry Spaniards move elsewhere.1 As these 
Westerners began to realise almost 500 years 
ago, the archipelago has a variety of societies 
with cultural differences and many languages. 
In pre-European Solomon Islands, as today, 
kinship was the cement of each society, binding 
the individual to the group. It was the basis for 
claims to use terrestrial and maritime resources 
for food production and other necessities. Most 
clans traced their claims through an apical 
ancestor who first cleared patches in the forest, 
cultivated and settled land or fished a reef. The 
labour expended to domesticate the wild bound 
people to place, creating a history and identity. 
Livelihood and affection evoked attachment 
to home places. Within these home places, 
however, there was often significant mobility. 
Many groups moved from site to site over some 
kilometres, motivated by population growth, 
quarrels, defence, natural disasters, and the 
search for accessible garden land. Trading and 
socialising parties flowed periodically between 
coastal and inland settlements. Beyond this 
localised movement, most Solomon Islanders 
were not highly mobile. Occasionally, women 
married across some distances, but rarely beyond 
their language group and affiliated clans. 
Expeditions of men often went from island to 
island to barter with their counterparts. Men 
also raided across large distances, all the more 
so after the introduction of European metal in 
the early nineteenth century when headhunters 
could perform decapitations more efficiently. 
Less commonly, conquerors moved into the 
lands of defeated people. Often the claims 
of conquerors were consolidated through inter-
marriage with them. These conquerors usually 
established lineages that produced candidates for 
leadership over generations.
Particularly in the western islands, there 
were hereditary chiefly families whose sons 
were most likely to succeed in the leadership 
stakes, but they had to demonstrate ability 
or they would be sidelined. Mostly, however, 
leaders were self-made men, who because of 
their entrepreneurial and organisational skills, 
attracted kin and others. These men were often 
warriors, perceived as having access to powerful 
spiritual forces through their ancestors. They 
were conduits for the distribution of wealth and 
prestige. Wealth, especially foodstuffs, was rarely 
held or stored for long. It was invested in social 
capital that underwrote the leader’s term. When 
wealth and prestige dried up, followers would 
shift their support to a younger, more promising 
man. Be it the leader, chief or big man, he 
had influence over a few hundred people at the 
most, but his reputation often spread beyond 
affiliated hamlets. Though there were relatively 
large clusters of people who spoke one of 
the archipelago’s 86 languages, it seems most 
societies were small-scale, probably reflecting 
the need to move hamlets to fresh gardening 
land and to avoid disease. Whatever the 
reasons, small groups and localised identity were 
characteristics of Solomons societies, just as 
attracting and distributing wealth were marks of 
a leader.
Thus it was rare that even a small island 
such as Santa Ana (Owa Raha), let alone larger 
islands, had any kind of paramount head. There 
was no class of leaders across the Melanesian 
islands, though a powerful big man or chief 
was likely to exhibit respect in dealing with 
his neighbouring counterparts in peacetime. 
The great chief Gorai of Alu, Shortlands, 
for example, had connections across the 
Bougainville Strait into the Bougainville plains 
where he could, because of chiefly alliances, 
assist white traders to collect copra in the late 
nineteenth century. 
As with the plains of inland Buin, some 
settlements might be famed for the productivity 
of their soils. Others could be notable for the 
riches of their seas, the prowess of their warriors, 
the beauty and character of their women, or 
their people’s skills at adding value to localised 
resources such as stone, shell, timber or fibre. 
Throughout the islands, there were villages that 
earned a degree of fame, but unless they had 
some long-term resource, this could blossom or 
bennet 3/2/03, 4:55 PM2-3
  Roots of Conflict in Solomon Islands
3
no harsher than local sanctions.4 In 1927, 
three policemen, Funusua, Gena, and Veki 
were murdered at Verakona, in inland eastern 
Guadalcanal, partly because the unsupervised 
police exceeded their powers. The fact that 
these bush people had to pay male head tax from 
1921 at Aola to a district officer who had never 
patrolled the region probably contributed to 
their resentment of the colonial administration. 
The courts found six of the accused guilty and 
hanged them.5 In the same year, 1927, a tax 
collecting patrol led by District Officer William 
Bell and Cadet K. C. Lillies was attacked. These 
two men and twelve Solomon Islanders died 
at the hands of Basiana and his Kwaio allies 
at Sinalagu, Malaita. Again, the government 
hanged six of the accused.6 By and large, this 
was the end of violent confrontations. 
Other methods of resistance emerged in 
the1930s. In the New Georgia Islands local 
leaders involved Methodist missionary, J. F. 
Goldie in a successful protest against the 
scale of taxation made onerous by the decline 
of copra prices during the Great Depression. 
In the central Solomons, the Melanesian 
Mission’s priest, Richard Fallowes chaired 
meetings, mediating demands for recognition 
of Melanesian values, formal education, and 
greater economic participation. Because the 
‘chair and rule’ or the Fallowes movement had 
supporters from most of the central islands, 
the government saw it as having political 
overtones, so it deported Fallowes, weakening 
the movement.7 
Although the missions supported their 
followers they were also allies of the 
government.8 They provided a new ideology 
of peace that assisted the transition from 
local control to a more centralised system. 
As conditions became securer for outsiders 
and for Solomon Islanders around the islands, 
white planters as well as traders extended their 
operations. In doing this, government, missions, 
traders, and planters created new centres of 
influence and power in the eyes of the local 
people, at a time when the incoming tide of 
Western trade goods reduced the significance of 
many old centres, famed for their stone quarries 
and fashioning of weapons such as fibre shields.9 
There were small government stations in each 
district, like Auki on Malaita and Aola on 
Guadalcanal. By the 1920s the administrative 
centre at Tulagi in the Florida Islands was the 
most substantial expatriate settlement. Other 
than the native hospital ward, the native 
counters at Burns Philps’ and W. R. Carpenter’s 
shops and the several Chinese trade stores open 
fade as the generations were born and died. 
Overall, there were dispersed foci of power 
in myriad leading people as well as places; 
there was no overarching central person or 
place dominating large areas and islands. 
Shifting clusters of significance, not hierarchies, 
characterised Solomons’ political and social 
geography.2 
Many Solomon Islanders knew much about 
the world of the European long before foreign 
warships began plying their seas in the 
1870s-1880s. Following the transient whalers 
came a handful of resident traders, and labour 
ships looking for people to work on the 
plantations of Fiji, Queensland, Samoa, and on 
the farms and mines of New Caledonia. As 
early as the 1860s when cotton and coconut 
plantations were being established in the South 
Pacific, men and some women from practically 
every island in the Solomons went overseas 
as labourers. Many were taken against their 
will, especially in first contact situations. In 
a short time, however, local preference and 
alternative opportunities confined both the 
numbers ‘blackbirded’, as well as volunteers, 
to people mainly from Malaita, Guadalcanal, 
parts of Makira, and Santa Cruz. More than 
50 per cent of the Solomons’ total labour 
came from Malaita.3 Malaitans had little else 
to offer but their labour. Recruits sought metal 
goods, especially edged tools, firearms, cloth, 
and tobacco in return for their work. Brought to 
the islands, these new forms of wealth eased the 
labour required for subsistence while bringing 
the returnees significance as benefactors to their 
extended families. Some, as go-betweens for 
labour vessels and recruits, like Kwaisulia of Ada 
Gege, Malaita, rose to prominence as big men 
until the labour trade ceased around 1911. 
A reluctant Britain declared a Protectorate 
over the Solomons in 1893, to regulate the 
labour and arms trade and to appease the 
Australasian colonies that feared the ambitions 
of other imperial nations. When the colonial 
establishment appeared in 1896, it consisted of 
the Resident Commissioner, Charles Woodford, 
a Guadalcanal man, Sergeant William Buruku, 
five Fijian policemen, and a whaleboat to 
control an archipelago of an estimated 100,000 
people. The British were few, but they were 
determined. By about 1900 with a handful of 
officers, a local militia, and later regular police, 
they gradually brought coastal areas and the 
smaller islands under control, disarming men 
and capturing known killers in the face of 
sporadic and localised resistance into the late 
1920s. Colonial methods were harsh, but 
bennet 3/2/03, 4:55 PM2-3
  State, Society and Governance in Melanesia
4
to local people, the amenities of hotels, the 
clubs, the cricket ground, golf and tennis courts 
were for the Europeans. Before World War 
Two, even the offices of the government–the 
lands office, the government officers’ and police 
quarters, the court house, the gaol, the post 
office, the customs office, and the wireless 
station–were as much the means to regulate 
Solomon Islanders as to improve their standard 
of living and security. Unlike the Europeans 
and even the Chinese, Islanders were under a 
nightly curfew at Tulagi. Though local women 
were permitted to visit Tulagi, none could 
reside there in the early years as the first 
Resident Commissioner considered that they 
caused trouble among the men.10 To Solomon 
Islanders, the colonial town was an interesting 
and even an amazing place, but it was not theirs.
Solomon Islanders were more at ease on 
the mission stations, which were centres of 
evangelisation, Western education, medical care 
and value-added local resources such as milled 
timber. These facilities were there for Solomon 
Islanders because of the Christian charity of 
expatriate workers and churches. Spirituality was 
part of the worldview of Solomon Islanders 
and many saw a connection between the 
new religious teaching and the opportunities 
the missions offered. Others, gutted by the 
government’s ‘pacification’ policies that 
destroyed raiding as a means to spiritual power, 
accepted the missions to come to terms with 
the new dispensation. Christianity opened the 
path to the wider world, just as it opened 
paths between communities by facilitating the 
intermingling of people from different societies 
and the reconciliation of former enemies. The 
first Solomon Islander medical practitioners, 
government clerks and radio operators were 
products of pre-War mission schools, as were 
most teachers. The lives of Solomon Islanders 
were greatly enriched by the missions, although 
it was the government’s establishment of 
colonial law and order that enabled things to 
flower. 
The missions encouraged family life, as they 
understood it. Old customs that influenced 
family size came under scrutiny. Christianity 
forbade abortion and infanticide. Formerly, fear 
of raids and the need to be able to run with 
only one child-in-arms meant child-spacing for 
couples. Men usually slept apart from their wives 
who had just given birth and lived in the 
canoe or men’s house until a baby had ceased 
to suckle–three to four years. Men’s houses 
were also associated with raiding and old 
religious beliefs. With peace and evangelisation 
these became redundant. Mission influence in 
Methodist areas reduced the infant’s suckling 
period to one year, making conception more 
likely. Missionaries favoured nuclear family 
living under one roof, thus there was more 
acceptance of resumption of sexual contact and 
no need to limit the size of families, especially 
since introduced diseases had reduced numbers 
until the 1920s.11 
The coconut plantations of the 1900s-1920s 
were more contested places. Big companies 
like Lever’s Pacific Plantations and Burns 
Philp’s subsidiaries as well as smaller companies 
cleared and planted coastal stretches with 
Solomon Islander labour, mainly in the central 
and western islands. These plantations were 
workplaces for thousands of men for at least two 
years of their lives. Often conditions were harsh, 
especially until the 1920s when government 
labour inspectors began checking plantations 
regularly. The plantation, however, was a work 
place familiar to Solomon Islanders, who had 
undertaken decades of indenture overseas. It 
extended the men’s knowledge of one another, 
the colonial workplace, and its systems, as 
well as inducting many into the rudiments 
of the cash economy. In their conflicts with 
management it provided a milieu for the 
emergence of regional and sometimes island-
based solidarity among the men, most markedly 
for Malaitans who made up almost two-thirds 
of the workforce. But consensus was situational 
and, once back home, ancient divisions easily 
resurfaced. Although planters considered the 
Malaitans tough men to deal with, because they 
came from an island where life was rarely easy, 
that very toughness made them valued labourers. 
Other groups tended to tread lightly around 
Malaitans in numbers, though conflicts were 
not unusual because of Malaitan sensitivity to 
slights against their customs and mutual fear of 
sorcery. Just as the plantation sector dominated 
the pre-war economy, so too did the more 
numerous Malaitans dominate the Protectorate’s 
work force, often in more ways than one.12 
The advent of colonial control changed 
Solomon Islanders’ lives. Formerly, warrior 
leaders guaranteed the prestige and safety 
of their community by suborning enemy 
settlements and taking heads or captives. Within 
communities, many wrongs could be righted 
by compensation to injured parties. When 
compensation and restorative justice failed, or 
the alleged offender or the magnitude of the 
offence was outside the scope of allied clans, 
families or big men hired vengeance men, called 
ramo or lamo on Malaita, to carry out killings 
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POST WAR PLANNING
World War Two involved the Solomons 
when the Japanese invaded in 1942 as part 
of their intended advance to Australia. Allied 
forces fought the Japanese on the islands 
west of Makira and Malaita, resulting in 
great hardship for local people. About 5000 
men, mainly Malaitans, worked in the Labour 
Corps and some as soldiers with the Allies. 
Individual Solomon Islanders displayed fortitude 
and intelligence in dealing with the Japanese. 
Former policeman Jacob Vouza from Aola 
survived Japanese torture and never divulged 
information about Allied positions. Guadalcanal 
men in the south coast carried out their own 
guerrilla operation near Veuru against a Japanese 
post, killing all the troops.15 
The experience of war on an industrialised 
scale, though often traumatic, further enlarged 
the Solomon Islanders’ perceptions, especially 
of the Americans, and the rest of the world. 
Coming in the wake of the stirrings of the 
Fallowes movement, the political ideas of 
Americans raised hopes among some of their 
greater political and economic involvement 
post-war. Political movements on Guadalcanal 
and Malaita focussed on challenging the 
administration’s political and cultural 
hegemony. In Guadalcanal’s north-west, 
Mathew Belamatanga’s movement adopted the 
tenets of the new United Nations Charter–the 
four freedoms; of religion and speech and 
from want and fear. He wanted political 
representation in government, codified 
customary law to rule on local issues, as well 
as economic development and improved formal 
education. The largest movement, however, 
was Maasina Rulu, based on Malaita. This 
not only appealed to some on other islands 
such as Makira and Santa Isabel, but also 
became increasingly militant in its demands 
for higher wages on plantations, respect for 
customs (kastomu), and island self-government. 
Most Malaitans refused their labour, which 
was needed for post-war reconstruction, and 
Malaitan leaders, as in Belamatanga’s following, 
used intimidation against those who supported 
the administration. Elements even appealed to 
cultic dreams of ‘cargo’, though today many 
deny this aspect. Confrontations led to the 
imprisonment of leaders and eventually their 
release in 1952, on the understanding that the 
government would spend more time and money 
on Malaitan development.
to redress the imbalance. This talion law made 
for a sort of rough justice, but it did not foster 
security because the innocent and the weak, 
especially women, were often victims taken or 
offered to satisfy constant ‘payback’. With the 
government in control, it was now its role to 
arrest, judge, punish, and protect. Many resented 
this and incoming regulations, but in time 
most acquiesced. Few would claim that peace 
and personal security were negative features of 
colonialism. In the process, warrior leaders and 
the paid assassins and ramo lost power and 
prestige, though their fame lived on in story. 
Service as a government district headman or 
catechist provided new avenues to influence, but 
those who had lost most rarely were able to 
make the transition to such ideologically novel 
positions.13 
Peace and participation in a widening 
world exacted another price. The colonial state 
needed revenue to finance its administration. 
Plantations could provide a revenue base, but 
this meant getting land on which to situate 
them. With increased security, traders often 
used links with local groups to purchase land 
for themselves or big companies. Resident 
Commissioner Woodford in 1900 believed 
large areas of seemingly unoccupied land, 
mainly in the west, should be opened up for 
development. What he had not considered was 
that headhunting and raiding had escalated from 
around the 1840s, as new weapons came into 
the country. This had driven depleted coastal 
populations inland to safe, hidden locations. 
Though by the 1920s over half of this ‘waste 
land’ had been re-claimed by Solomon Islanders 
via the Lands Commission, the government’s 
allocation of the rest to companies like Lever’s, 
who left large sections of the land idle, 
antagonised claimants. While in 1912 the 
government banned freehold sales to non-
Solomon Islanders in favour of a lease system, 
the government’s role in preventing the large-
scale alienation of inhabited coastal lands is 
little acknowledged today. Its motives had been 
mixed–the desire to prevent land speculation 
being prominent. Even so, the outcome meant 
that 95 per cent of the land remained in 
customary ownership, a far higher percentage 
than in neighbouring New Hebrides, New 
Caledonia, or even the British colony of Fiji.14 
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Much was done in this direction, including 
the establishment and extension of local 
councils, an outcome of colonial policy rather 
than of indigenous demands. It was part of 
a wider agenda of development for Britain’s 
possessions so that both its colonial people and 
their economies could become self-supporting.16 
Like the Marshall Plan in Europe and US 
support of the Japanese recovery, ‘aid’–so the 
development experts thought–would bring this 
to the Third World. It was an investment in 
economic development that would enable the 
people to attain their expanding aspirations.17 
To start this process, the British 
administration designated Honiara on northern 
Guadalcanal as the new capital and purchased 
the lands of planting companies. The plans 
for a vastly expanded administration meant 
more public buildings and, in the aeroplane 
age, access to the wartime Henderson airfield. 
The Guadalcanal plains held more promise for 
agricultural experiments than the limited hills 
of Tulagi and adjacent islands in the Florida 
group.18
Honiara from the late 1940s grew to 
a township of about 5000 in the 1960s, 
but was still mainly an expatriate enclave. 
The population had trebled by independence 
in 1978, as increasing numbers of Solomon 
Islanders came to live there, even if only on 
a periodic basis.19 It was the first real town 
that most Solomon Islanders knew, with the 
predictable array of government offices, as well 
as a hospital, hotel, clubs, churches, banks, 
stores, warehouses, a market, a ‘China Town’, 
picture theatre, sports ground, schools, and an 
artificial harbour. An expanding road system 
followed the wartime template of the American 
bases, winding its way east and west and into the 
hills, where houses were being built for public 
servants and private business people. At Point 
Cruz, ships came and went as did international 
flights to Henderson field and, by 1963, inter-
island flights.20 
The more Honiara had to offer, the less 
the administration decentralised, though district 
centres like Gizo and Auki were much larger 
than their pre-war antecedents. Once Maasinu 
Rulu dissipated, men flocked to Honiara from 
the 1950s to work on construction projects. The 
bulk of these came from Malaita. No longer 
was the plantation sector the sole employer 
of local people. The government in 1948 had 
discarded the indenture system that kept wages 
relatively low and made strikes illegal. The 
Great Depression of the 1930s, the wartime 
destruction of plantations and plants, along with 
the abolition of indenture meant that many 
planters did not return to the islands. Post-war 
copra production was less from plantations 
and more from households, supplementing the 
subsistence economy.
As infrastructure was concentrated around 
Honiara, commercial development tended to 
gravitate there. Yet significant expansion in 
health, education, and basic communications 
facilities for the archipelago occurred before 
independence. The annual spending of the 
British government from the post-war period 
outran local revenues, so various grants 
supplemented this in the hope of setting the 
foundation for eventual financial viability. From 
the late 1940s the administration was seeking 
ways to development, conducting surveys of 
forests, land tenure, geology, soils, and overall 
land resources. The seas rich in tuna seemed 
promising, but establishing the industry would 
have meant heavy competition from the experts, 
the Americans and the Japanese, who before the 
mid 1980s dominated the oceans. In the mid 
1970s the government reached an agreement 
with Taiyo, a Japanese company which built a 
cannery that, with the fishing, provided some 
employment and reasonable returns until the 
late 1980s. Oil palm grown on an industrial 
scale by the Commonwealth Development 
Corporation seemed a likely contributor to 
revenue and land for this was leased on 
north Guadalcanal. Planting began in the early 
1970s and ten years later 5000 hectares were 
under palms. Plans for mining on Rennell and 
elsewhere in the 1970s collapsed in the face 
of local objections and predicted small loads. 
With increasing small holder copra and cocoa 
production it seemed that fishing, palm oil, and 
a mix of other primary industries could make the 
Solomons economically viable. 
The colonial government belatedly tried 
decentralisation. In 1976, a land resources 
survey found 43 areas dispersed around the 
islands with better than average development 
potential, mainly for agriculture. These areas 
could attract basic infrastructure and perhaps 
rural training centres. Yet the keystone for this, 
and one both the colonial and independent 
governments failed to put in place, was the 
acquisition of the land for those who wished 
to develop it. Earlier government attempts to 
encourage group registration of land, by ‘land 
settlement’–so plots could be leased to some 
of their number–had little success. Solomon 
Islanders were loath to relinquish control of 
land and when they did lease it out, there was 
often resentment that someone else was making 
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MENTALITIES OF DEPENDENCY
At independence it was possible that 
Solomons might manage to balance its books if 
commodity prices remained stable and the input 
of aid funds continued. But dependence on aid 
for about one third of the government’s finances 
in 1978 followed 35 years of dependence on 
British grants. In terms of interaction with the 
outside world it had been almost 40 years since 
Solomons paid its way and financed all its own 
services, limited though they had been. Dig 
a little more deeply and it can be said that 
‘aid’ started long before, back in the 1900s as 
missions transferred funds, plant, skilled labour, 
and expertise from Australia, New Zealand and 
Britain to subsidise not only the spiritual, but 
also the secular development of their followers.23 
Aid might kick-start development; it could just 
as easily fail and become the first resort to fix 
every problem. The dependency habit was going 
to be hard to break.
This also induced a habit of mind regarding 
government. Except when it came to any 
plans it had for their land, most Solomon 
Islanders grudgingly trusted the post-war British 
administration, but they also saw it more as 
a provider, rather than a facilitator. Post-war 
reconstruction coupled with a development 
agenda had resulted in a large public service 
doing much that was done elsewhere by private 
enterprise. By the mid 1970s, most Solomon 
Islanders were content to see the British stay 
longer, though a few university graduates called 
for independence. The British had hoped a more 
realistic assessment of the role of government 
might come with increased localisation of the 
public service in 1970. A counter productive 
effect was for these new public servants to 
seek parity with expatriates, a cost that would 
be beyond the pocket of any independent 
government. The colonial servants, though they 
may have had many cultural blind spots, were 
rarely dishonest. This produced expectations of 
similar behaviour from their successors.24 
Although political representation, structures 
based on the Westminster model, and elections 
had been phased in step by step from about 
1960, Solomon Islanders tended to see these as 
novel, if not exotic institutions.25 The British, 
having no alternatives and little imagination, 
introduced a political system that had taken 
hundreds of years to evolve (often through 
bloody conflict in the distant north) and hoped 
the transplant would not be rejected. With little 
formal education and literacy, Solomon Islanders 
money out of ‘their’ land. Nowhere was this 
more evident than in the forestry sector.
The most promising potential income earner 
in terms of renewable resources was the forest. 
By 1978 four major companies were logging 
and paying royalties and taxes on their logs. 
Some, like Levers, did significant training 
among a local workforce lacking basic skills. As 
extraction proceeded, the Forestry Department 
was replanting much of this land. The colonial 
government had made it impossible for Solomon 
Islanders to alienate their rights to timber on 
customary land as well as to customary land 
itself–except to the government. The Forestry 
Department wanted land for replanting to 
guarantee a cycle of sustainable commercial log 
production, but it had obtained only about 
half of that needed before independence in 
1978. The British believed the forest estate 
would be an enduring economic asset. Yet few 
Solomon Islanders found attractive the idea of 
either selling their land and the trees to the 
government for logging and reforestation or 
selling their timber rights to the government to 
on-sell to loggers. They wanted to do the deals 
themselves because they would retain control 
of their land and obtain, so they believed, a 
better return in royalties. When, on the eve of 
independence, the national house of assembly 
voted to approve direct dealing between local 
timber rights’ holders on customary land 
and logging companies, no Solomon Islanders 
foresaw the potential for the exploitation of 
their resources.21 
The colonial government had worked hard 
to safeguard the forest estate, but was tardy in 
providing education. The post-war emphasis had 
been on basic primary education and extending 
this as equitably as possible. As independence 
did not enter Britain’s thinking until the 1960s 
there was little time to extend education further. 
Yet higher education was needed to train 
Solomon Islanders for government. Although 
teacher training was underway in Honiara in 
the early 1960s, true secondary schools had 
not opened until then and by independence 
numbered only six, including only one 
government school. Consequently in 1978 there 
were only a dozen or so University graduates.22 
The expertise and productivity of the primary 
producer plus aid in the form of overseas 
expertise, it seemed, might buy enough time for 
a generation to receive the higher education 
essential to staff an effective government.
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seemed content to not interrogate the process 
or the candidates closely. Their aspirations were 
uncomplicated. Most wanted some cash income 
from crops or local employment to supplement 
their subsistence living and, like most of us, 
schools, medical treatment, transport to friends 
and family, markets and services close at hand 
to provide a good life for their children. They 
wanted peace and security, which in the pre-
European Solomons had been often tenuous, but 
by 1978 with a generation of peace and order 
since the war and Maasina Rulu, this seemed 
almost an established fact of life in the ‘Happy 
Isles’. If the government provided all this or the 
means to it, it was good government.
CHALLENGES TO THE 
GOVERNMENTS OF INDEPENDENCE
In hindsight, the governments of 
independence were walking a tightrope because 
of their financial dependence on a limited 
range of primary exports. If they could control 
government spending, if markets for the 
range of Solomons’ products remained fairly 
buoyant, and the terms of trade remained 
favourable, then the future seemed secure. Aid, 
wisely managed and directed, would help this. 
Regional aspirations, largely subsumed by British 
centralisation and the focus on independence, 
soon emerged, however many continued to 
believe that Honiara took a disproportionate 
share of resources. Any capital city has 
to be somewhere and the island it was 
on, Guadalcanal, became associated with a 
monopolisation of services and facilities. Many 
groups, whether on Vanikoro or even Vella 
Lavella, saw themselves as victims of ‘distance 
decay’; they were far from the centre of things 
and their area/island was not given equal 
consideration by the central government in the 
allocation of services.26 
Yet this was the way some Guadalcanal 
people also saw themselves. The Weather 
Coast with its large population was distant in 
terms of markets, services, and communication; 
its geographical proximity not mirroring 
accessibility. Elsewhere too there was 
dissatisfaction. Periodically, for example in 
1987, groups of northern Guadalcanal people 
complained to the Prime Minister about the 
increasing number of Malaitans on their lands. 
Yet no one had ever brought a court case 
against them because there were various legal 
purchase and informal leasing arrangements 
permitted by the local people.27 But, like 
migrants everywhere, when a man had found a 
job in Honiara, made a garden and, with a few 
relations, built himself a house he would send 
for his wife and children, then a brother might 
come and eventually a parent and cousins. As 
the links became a chain, numbers often grew 
beyond the agreement between the first settler 
and his vendor or landlord. The picture was 
even more complex because rights to land pass 
through Guadalcanal women, but a brother 
or uncle might allow a Malaitan a piece of 
matrilineal land. Over the years, however, as 
that one house became a hamlet and young, 
unemployed north Guadalcanal people needed 
garden land they often found their lands pock-
marked by Malaitan settlements. Rather than 
blame their kinsmen, their displeasure fell upon 
the settlers. As is so often the case anywhere 
with a migrant group, once the settlers’ numbers 
rose they became more confident in the 
expression of their cultural ways–ways that 
sometimes offended the Guadalcanal people.28 
One solution to erasing perceived disparities 
between Honiara and the rest of the Solomon 
Islands was provincial government. This seemed 
even more appealing when just before 
independence a group of politicians led a 
’breakaway’ movement in the Western District. 
Part of their agenda was possible unification 
with Bougainville with which there were 
ancient linkages across the Bougainville strait. 
With its black-skinned people like those of the 
western Solomons, Bougainville was admired for 
its productivity and its copper mine at Panguna. 
The central government managed to contain 
this movement until it created provincial 
governments in 1980 and this seemed to satisfy 
the western people. Provincial government 
added another tier of paid officials, yet there 
was no appreciable improvement to the overall 
economy, efficiency, or services and Honiara still 
held the purse strings.29 
Bougainville was to remain a focus in 
Solomons in the late 1980s, but for more 
portentous reasons. A protracted civil war there 
with the Papua New Guinea government broke 
out over the control of mining revenues. 
Though thousands of Bougainvilleans died, the 
war demonstrated that a central government, 
even with a well-equipped standing army, 
could be challenged by a relatively small 
number of armed men. Moreover, in offering 
succour to Bougainville refugees, the Solomons 
government opened the way for their residence 
in Honiara. Members of the Bougainville 
Revolutionary Army (BRA) crossed the border 
as far as Guadalcanal in search of supplies 
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and wartime caches of weapons. Meanwhile 
Prime Minster Mamaloni imported high-
powered weapons in case of conflict with 
Bougainvilleans. These Bougainvilleans were a 
source of irritation to the Papua New Guinea 
government, embarrassment to the Solomons’ 
government, and interest to disaffected young 
Solomon Islanders on Honiara’ s periphery.30 
Solomons was changing and not for the 
better. The years brought falls not only in 
commodity prices, but also the standards of 
governance. With little public savings and high 
commodity spending, instead of living within a 
tight budget, governments continued to borrow 
and gradually the interest payments on loans 
increased. Aid, though well intended, before the 
early 1990s failed to encourage the government 
to live within its means. In retrospect, the 
donors needed to exercise the power of the purse 
more and ‘political correctness’ less. Yet aid 
donors, irrespective of their political agendas, 
seem to have thought that every big project 
would be the last, but dependency dragged 
on. Biting the bullet of realistic budgeting in 
the Pacific’s ‘welfare lake’ of the late 1970s 
and 1980s did not appeal to its politicians. 
Instead of proactive policies on population 
to fit economic parameters, for example, the 
government acquiesced in the startling 3.5 per 
cent annual growth. In a desperate drive to 
continue to provide government services and 
to remain in power, politicians since the early 
1980s increasingly have raided resources or 
permitted others to plunder them.
The loss of timber resources gathered 
momentum in the 1980s. Asia-based logging 
companies poured into the Solomons because 
logging was restricted by controls in South 
East Asia. The Asian way of doing business, 
smoothed by gifts and favours, fell within the 
cultural ambit of Solomons’ societies. These 
loggers have many allies in Solomons. Rights 
to whole forests, including former government 
plantations, have been sold with little return 
to the public purse, but ample reward to a few 
individuals who facilitated the loggers. At the 
village level, the big man or the local spokesman 
able to read and sign papers conjured for their 
families and clans’ dreams of the roads, schools, 
clinics, and employment that were supposed to 
come with logging; at the regional level, the 
chiefly educated son saw his prestige expanding 
as he collected director’s fees to head a local 
paper company that was a front for a giant 
Malaysian company; at the provincial level, the 
premier had a house built by the loggers or 
a new truck and a wharf for the province; 
at the national level, the politicians received 
thousands of dollars in ‘gifts’ and trips to Asia 
while they suborned public servants to sign 
licences for unsustainable logging. Often these 
public servants were harassed by rural relatives 
to expedite a license for loggers on their island. 
Out in the forest, public servants who tried 
to assess customs dues were plied with loggers’ 
offers of transportation, hospitality, and gifts to 
turn a blind eye to the thousands of dollars of 
undeclared valuable furniture trees loaded on 
ships as ordinary timber. 
By the late 1990s it would have been hard 
for them to say no; the standards of political 
morality were falling and corruption and self-
serving among the so-called elite so obvious 
that none could miss it. The governments of 
Solomon Mamaloni encouraged this behaviour, 
undermined the timber control units of the 
Forestry Division, and allowed the issue 
of licenses to overseas loggers with local 
partnerships to obtain massive tax and duty 
exemptions and remissions, calculated in 1995 
alone to have been worth $24 million. But 
Mamaloni’s governments had no patent on 
such behaviour. At the micro-level of the 
village and region, few loggers brought any 
permanent services as promised–these appeared 
and disappeared in direct proportion to the time 
it took loggers to complete their operations. 
Yet even when this was understood by some, 
individuals, just as the politicians did, could 
make much in a short time by assisting loggers’ 
entry. There was always the hope among the 
rights’ owners that ‘their’ loggers would deliver, 
that they and their place would prosper and be 
significant. 
The decline in political morality on the 
national stage can be accounted for in part 
by the fact that intending politicians, with the 
help of loggers, could muster money to win 
support among their communities. Of course, 
the loggers expected favourable treatment later. 
An incumbent could have similar backers, 
but if not, had access to the government’s 
Constituency Development fund established in 
the early 1990s to assist members with funding 
small local projects. This fund grew in size, 
but remained outside the auditors’ range. By 
the mid 1990s it was a source of political 
sweeteners prior to national elections. With so 
many candidates trying for the prize of the 
high salaries and ‘perks’ of parliament, some 
were elected with less than 10 percent of the 
vote. Solomons has spawned politicians by the 
hundreds; but has produced few, if any, real 
statesmen. So much for democracy. Solomon 
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Islanders seemed reluctant to question the 
candidate’s platform so long as it was focussed 
on local needs, because they expected returns for 
their community once their man was in. Like 
many electors elsewhere, concerns beyond the 
local were not part of their purview. Effective 
political parties might have raised the sights of 
the people to national concerns. Although they 
existed in name, there have been no political 
parties of any substance or longevity. A shaky 
prime minister or a challenger to the incumbent 
simply offered key men a ministry along with 
the higher salary that extinguished any flicker 
of party loyalty. A more devious one would lay 
traps for potential opponents, such as access 
to easy money, and then use blackmail to win 
support. The people of Solomons have now 
seen their trust betrayed and are suspicious of 
politicians as supposed guardians of the state; 
but paradoxically they still elect them because 
they seem the only means of fulfilling needs 
through favours within their own electorates. 
Thus by putting such men in place the people 
are propping up a weak, rotting state.
To cover revenue loss from the decline in 
commodity prices as well as transfer pricing 
of logs, timber exported as undeclared species, 
and duty remissions, the desperate national 
government continued to issue logging licences 
in the 1990s, increasing the allowable cut to ten 
times the sustainable level. Borrowing overseas 
continued also and when this became too great 
for the lenders or for the Central Bank to 
countenance, the government raided provident 
funds and reserves. In this climate, aid became 
more and more a political tool. Some donor 
governments, such as Australia, tried to use it 
to contain resource over-exploitation in the 
mid and late 1990s.31 Since 1999, Taiwan, in 
order to hold Solomons’ vote for its status 
as the Republic of China in the international 
arena, seems bent on underwriting any scheme, 
no matter how questionable to preserve a 
semblance of government.32 
Loss of revenue to government mirrored the 
loss of income sources for Solomon Islanders. 
Although in the 1980s the public service had 
grown too big for such a small country, the 
cuts encouraged by right wing economists 
of the World Bank and Australia and New 
Zealand promised long-term benefits, but social 
cost. There were few employment opportunities 
for young Solomon Islanders, especially those 
with little education, and opportunities further 
declined in the late 1990s. Population continued 
to grow faster than GDP.33 This was a youthful 
population with higher aspirations than its 
parents. In the towns it fed on images from the 
shabby video parlours that portrayed violence as 
a means to satisfy those aspirations. 
IMPLOSION: ‘ETHNIC TENSION’ 
AND THE COUP
The immediate causes of the conflict of 
1998-2001 are well known. Each year in the 
late 1990s the government and Honiara’ s public 
infrastructure teetered on the brink of collapse 
and bankruptcy, yet there always seemed some 
donor willing to carry the country for a bit 
longer or another forest or fishing right that 
could be sold off. When Solomon Mamaloni 
lost in the elections of August 1997, it 
seemed that the evil day could be postponed, 
perhaps cancelled. An experienced politician, 
Bart Ulufa’alu became prime minister. He faced 
a sick economy; its parlous condition made 
worse in 1997 by the Asian economic crisis, 
but at least this gave some respite to the 
frantic rate of logging. Falling in with the 
New Right economic policies of the World 
Bank and its supporters among aid donors, he 
began by implementing more vigorously than 
Mamaloni the reduction of the public service 
and privatisation of the government’s interests. 
This alienated the unions and produced 
competitors for control of the assets. He 
supported the return of Australian aid to the 
Forestry Division and a Forest Act which would 
have not only reduced the logging quota to a 
more sustainable level, but also would have seen 
much more regulation of the industry. By 1998 
there were signs that the decline in the economy 
was turning around. It seemed that Solomons 
was pulling back from the brink.35 
A small push saw it fall. The premier of 
Guadalcanal Province, E. Alebua, in mid 1998 
demanded that the national government pay 
compensation for 25 Guadalcanal people who 
had been murdered by various Malaitans during 
the preceding 20 years. He went on to 
seek, among other things, the return of lands 
purchased, rented, or occupied by Malaitans 
and payment from the national government for 
using Guadalcanal lands for its capital. Andrew 
Nori states that his precipitate actions resulted 
from a claim for compensation by parents when 
two Malaitan girls were raped at a Guadalcanal 
provincial school in May 1998. The province 
did nothing, but the Prime Minister, the 
Malaitan Ulufa’alu, paid the compensation from 
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the national coffers and then deducted this from 
the grants due to Guadalcanal province. 
Whatever the immediate cause, Alebua’s 
call was heard as blanket authorisation to 
harass Malaitans. This escalated as Guadalcanal 
youths, calling themselves the Guadalcanal 
Revolutionary Army pillaged, raped, and 
otherwise attacked Malaitans, leaving at least 28 
dead by August 1999.36 Andrew Nori claims 
that Alebua approved this militia and had 
dealings with their leaders soon after he made 
his demands. As Tarcisius Tara Kabutaulaka 
states, as early as 1996 some young Guadalcanal 
men had begun arming themselves from wartime 
caches on Guadalcanal.37 Following ineffectual 
police action and failed mediation by local 
church and international figures, Malaitans 
marched on parliament in November 1999 
to demand attention to their compensation 
claims for damages done by the Guadalcanal 
militia. Prime Minister Ulufa’alu denied that 
the national government owed compensation. 
Coming from a Malaitan, this unsympathetic 
stance inflamed other Malaitans. The Malaitan 
youth formed a militia, the Malaitan Eagle Force 
(MEF), and successfully raided a police armoury 
of high-powered weapons, attracting even more 
followers. In the fighting between the two sides, 
over 22,000 Malaitans were forced to return to 
their own island, losing property.38 Malaitans 
were not the only ones displaced. People from 
other provinces fled and lost as much. Soon, 
many businesses, both local and expatriate, 
closed as owners left Honiara in fear for their 
safety. The disturbances, for example, forced 
the closure of Solomon Islands Plantations Ltd 
(formerly CDC), a major employer in the 
province and a significant revenue earner for the 
country.39 
During early 2000 tensions did not lessen 
though Ulufa’alu sought to stop the fighting by 
talks with various factions. Meanwhile, the MEF 
wanted compensation and plotted to overthrow 
the Ulufa’alu government. A coup took place on 
5 June and Ulufa’alu was held against his will 
for some time. Former Malaitan parliamentarian 
and lawyer, Andrew Nori played a pivotal 
role, though he asserts he was not involved 
in instigating the plot. The running of the 
government then fell to the MEF in Honiara 
until an interim government under Manasseh 
Sogavare took over in late June, but the MEF 
along with others used their political cause as 
an excuse to plunder and rob. More local and 
expatriate people fled. The mining operation 
at Gold Ridge closed down. A hasty peace 
agreement brokered by Australia at Townsville 
in October 2000 saw some lessening of tension, 
but little disarmament as agreed. The dozen 
or so ‘peacekeepers’ sent to Solomons by 
Australia and New Zealand were observers of 
the disarmament process, not enforcers. These 
governments held and hold the view that 
it was up to Solomon Islanders to organise 
their own people, not outsiders. Meanwhile, 
the deputy Prime Minister, Allen Kemakeza 
dispensed compensation willy-nilly, his family 
being recipients before he was dismissed from 
the post, but he seems to have exacerbated 
the situation as payments were not distributed 
fairly. Most of this compensation fund came 
from a bank loan of $US 25 million from 
Taiwan.40 How it is to be repaid is anyone’s 
guess, but short-term solutions are no novelty to 
Solomons’ governments. 
A new government headed by Kemakeza 
in December 2001 has been no more effectual 
than its predecessor in enforcing law and the 
disarmament process. The government is less 
and less able to govern effectively and lacks 
the means to do so. The budget in March 
2002 drawn up by Michael Maina, for example, 
appealed for 60 per cent of government 
funding to come from aid donors, double 
the proportion of their contribution in 1978. 
Donors, distrusting the politicians, work around 
them through NGOs to assist schools and 
hospitals.41 In Guadalcanal and other areas 
such as Gizo groups of armed youths focus 
less on the politics of ‘ethnicity’ and more 
on intimidating those who oppose them. The 
police are helpless or, more often, partial. The 
Malaitan-Guadalcanal conflict has unleashed 
the dogs of war and it will take a strong hand 
and tight collars to again restrain them. 
TRACING THE ROOTS
The immediate events prior to the conflict 
and its course are reasonably clear though 
debate continues over details. Recent events can 
blur the deeper issues. This conflict between 
Malaitans and Guadalcanal groups, for example, 
has been called ‘ethnic tension’, but sometimes 
the ‘ethnicity’ of those involved is so uncertain 
that their interrogators have had to carry 
out language tests to see if the person 
can understand any Guadalcanal or Malaitan 
language. But, as Tarcisius Tara Kabutaulaka 
points out, this is the term that has gained 
currency in the overseas media.42 The jargon of 
the Balkans has been transposed to Melanesia. If 
it is hard to get beyond ethnicity, it is even more 
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difficult to discern the underlying roots of this 
terrible war because of the blinding immediacy 
of human loss, grief, anger, and consequent 
recriminations. 
Identification with place and region is 
embedded in the Solomon Islanders’ worldview, 
the source of contestation with other regions. 
Among the causes of the conflict lay the 
perceived disparities between the provinces and 
the capital, a centre that had grown fat on the 
wealth of other provinces. One Malaitan view is 
that there is intrinsic potential on their island, 
if only the central government had assisted with 
infrastructure and port development. This belief 
in Malaita’s potential goes back to Maasina Rulu 
times and even beyond to the labour trade 
days.43 Many Malaitans also believe that their 
greatest resource, their labour and enterprise–
focussed by necessity outside of their home 
island–has contributed to the common good. 
And they did this by migration and mobility, 
following opportunity just as their ancestors 
were encouraged to in the labour trade and in 
the plantation era before World War Two. The 
big difference then was most were repatriated. 
When the British administration brought peace 
and security and the missions encouraged 
the mingling of their followers, they were 
reinforcing the mobility of both the old trading 
expeditions and the labour trade, as well 
as setting precedents that Solomon Islanders 
embraced, all the more so with better sea and 
air transportation in the 1960s. Many Solomon 
Islanders now see it as a constitutional right to 
move freely about their country, a view often 
contested by their reluctant hosts.44 
In regard to unequal distribution, the 
western Solomon Islands with their richer 
forests perceived their province as having 
subsidised the centre and the nation for over 
two decades. This attachment to regional 
significance is understandable in terms of 
residence and kinship, but also in patterns of 
wider identification that emerged as colonialism 
created both the necessity and opportunity for 
communality. On the micro level, however, 
there are regions and islands within each 
province that have a similar perception in 
relation to their provincial centre, as say is the 
case with Vanikoro and the town of Lata on 
Santa Cruz. On Guadalcanal this is a major 
issue because the area formerly the most 
densely populated, outside Honiara, was the 
isolated Weather Coast. Natural disasters and 
increased opportunities elsewhere since the 
1970s have seen circular as well as virtually 
permanent migration to the north, but there was 
competition with settlers from other areas, most 
commonly Malaitans for places to live and to 
work. Whether from south Guadalcanal or other 
islands, people continued to come to Honiara 
because of the chance of work and access 
to schools, clinics, and shops. And the more 
that came, the more the spending on urban 
services expanded. And the more the rural 
people saw themselves as missing out. Yet, 
when employment was relatively abundant 
on Guadalcanal and elsewhere resentment 
against migrants from other islands was muted. 
It has been government mismanagement at 
several levels that has reduced employment 
opportunities and aggravated tensions.
Nowhere was mismanagement clearer than 
in the use of the vast forest resource 
on customary land. Environmentalists and 
economists, including the directors of the 
Central Bank of Solomons, agree that the 
government has worked the forest resource at 
an unsustainable level. This was not helped by 
the fire sale of the forest estate plantations in 
1995. Government attempts at reforestation had 
faltered in 1992. They died when the aid 
donors, including Britain, refused to continue 
to give millions of dollars when the Solomon 
Islands government neither allocated any of its 
logging revenue to reforestation nor followed 
forest policies of ‘wise use’. This unsustainable 
extraction was bad enough, but the greatest fault 
dating back to the early 1980s has been the 
acceleration, first by neglect and then by policy 
and connivance, of the failure to collect the 
real fiscal worth of the resource for the national 
benefit. Transfer pricing by Asian companies 
afflicted the industry from the 1980s, but 
continued except for the hey-day of timber 
control, subsidised by Australian aid from 
about 1992-1994. The Mamaloni governments 
then expanded the duty remissions and tax 
exemptions introduced by the naïve Billy Hilly 
government of 1993-1994–in order to encourage 
local logging companies. A nice concept, 
but soon colonised by the Asian backers 
of local paper companies and opportunistic 
politicians, including Solomon Mamaloni, who 
had directorships on such companies.
Solomon Islands suffered too from the lack 
of educated personnel. This certainly made for 
inefficiency and poor decision-making. It also 
meant that the wider population was not critical 
of the processes of government, though certain 
NGOs, notably the SIDC have worked hard 
in the 1990s to educate people as to their 
duties and rights as electors. As development aid 
and Solomons’ own funds produced a growing 
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cohort of tertiary graduates many found their 
way blocked and their expertise unheeded by 
older gatekeepers in power. Some struggled and 
still do to keep their country afloat, some found 
the lolly-scramble for cash from the troubles 
of 1999-2001 too tempting and snatched their 
handful, and others voted with their feet 
and remain working overseas, a huge loss to 
Solomons, but its greatest overseas asset.
Another cause of the events of 1999-2001 
can be found in the reality of population 
figures. The population at independence was 
over 195,000, but continued growing at about 
3.5 per cent yearly into the late 1980s, 
dropping off recently to 2.8 per cent. In 1986 
population was about 283, 500; by 2000 it 
had reached 450,000, about five times the 
population counted in the first census of 1931.45 
Few thought of the cumulative impact of this, 
set in train by Christianity and peace as well as, 
after the War, improved public health and large-
scale infant immunisation.46 When they did, it 
pertained to sexual relations so was not a fit 
subject for public discussion in the Melanesian 
context until the 1990s when AIDS appeared. 
This rapid population growth explains part of 
the failure of governments to provide health and 
education services for all. It also explains why 
local communities have turned to the loggers’ 
promises to meet these increasing needs and 
to the gilded suasions of would-be politicians. 
These numbers also have put pressure on the 
land because under the shifting cultivation 
method more land lies fallow than is cultivated. 
To regain its fertility the soil needs 6-20 
years to recover, depending on local conditions. 
Subsistence demands to feed this increasing 
population have decreased the length of this 
cycle in many areas, as has the use of land 
for cash crops. Commercial logging reduces the 
subsistence productivity of both the forest and 
diminishes soil fertility. Hence the need for 
people to move out of areas where there is 
not enough land to support their burgeoning 
numbers, such as on north Malaita.47 
Although it meant uneven development 
there was logic in the colonial government’s 
concentrating so much of its agricultural 
efforts on north Guadalcanal because of the 
topography. It, however, meant the area became 
a magnet for people seeking work and the 
majority were Malaitans–first for the large rice 
growing projects of the 1960s and then the 
CDC oil palm project and small industries such 
as breweries and sawmills. Large-scale projects 
were more likely to encourage investors and 
to promise significant returns than small ones 
scattered around the islands. The only other 
significant sustainable economic development 
(also originally funded by British aid to business 
in the form of CDC), Kolombangara Forest 
Products Ltd, logs and replants on a large scale 
on Kolombangara and has positive relationships 
with most land owners. Yet even this operation 
seeks more logs from ‘outgrowers’ on adjacent 
islands to expand its scale of operations. Simple 
economics of scale determine so much in 
Solomons and no government, provincial or 
central, can control this. 
Siting of commercial enterprises has been 
dogged by land disputes. These began to plague 
the CDC and others on north Guadalcanal, 
making governments wary of trying to negotiate 
land transfers on any significant scale elsewhere. 
Government land in many places has reverted to 
the provinces for purposes such as high schools 
or to the original owners. Unpalatable though 
it is for many, the land tenure system based 
on subsistence and small scale societies does 
not fit the drive towards a more capitalist 
and individualised mode of production to raise 
GDP. It cannot cater for thousands of incoming 
workers and their families residing on other 
people’s land. Yet Solomon Islanders wanted 
development, but, if long term, not on their 
clan’s land. Where they have allowed it, 
they constantly try to increase rentals, making 
predictability impossible for investors. Hence 
the friction over land use on north Guadalcanal.
There is friction too between continuing 
to tread the old pathways to power and the 
demands of the global economy. What fitted 
the political economy of Solomons societies 
prior to 1896 sits askew the systems designed for 
the diffusion of wealth on a wider scope than to 
a mere handful of local people and transnational 
companies. Resources have been exploited 
recklessly and those who have contributed to 
this within Solomons have followed the old 
pattern of big man as nexus for economic and 
social-political activity. The few have benefited 
and there have been spin-offs for their families 
and clans, but much of this wealth has dissipated 
in spending in a society unused to storage and 
accumulation of wealth. Wage earners, the local 
entrepreneur creating wealth–rather than just 
channelling it–and the investor for the long-
term want predictability, stability, equity, and 
the rule of law. Without these, life for the 
majority will be barely above subsistence, if that, 
as the emerging scenario in Solomons attests.
Part of the reason for clinging to the 
centrality of the big man is the failure of 
the transplanted political system based on the 
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Westminster model. Few Solomon Islanders own 
the national system as theirs. Introduced by 
the colonial ruler, it is seen still as a foreign 
superstructure, not a product of their efforts, so 
they lack both commitment to it and critique of 
it.48 A government that could conjure up assets 
and services from compliant aid donors, at 
least until recently, always seemed to muddle 
through, so why would it reform itself? Before 
and after the war social movements such as the 
Fellowes movement and Maasina Rulu showed 
that Solomon Islanders sought their own wider 
political structures reflecting Melanesian values 
that yet remain unrealised.
There were other roots deep in the 
Melanesian soil that affected events in 1998. 
Compensation is an ancient element of 
Melanesian culture, but it is found in all 
cultures, for example, in the Western law of 
torts. It can clear the way for reconciliation, 
lessening bitterness. But when it comes to major 
offences, such as murder, the introduced law, 
rightly or wrongly, has become the prime tool 
for over eighty years for punishing perpetrators. 
This law is less dependent on the status 
or gender of the parties concerned, offers a 
more objective exposition of evidence and a 
predictable range of punishments. Yet when 
the introduced law seems not to solve the 
problem, when the complainants do not activate 
its processes say, because of little faith in the 
police, there is a tendency to return to the old 
way. Ezekiel Alebua did this when he demanded 
retrospective compensation for the murders of 
Guadalcanal people. Whatever his particular 
motives, once an elected Premier takes such 
a stance, moral permission and latitude are 
given to the people to resort to older sanctions. 
Compensation can get out of hand as people 
have seen with the arbitrary allotments by 
Kemakeza under the Sogavare government, 
creating more problems. In early 2002 in 
Western Province, the killing of two Malaitans 
allegedly by Bougainvilleans resulted in 
compensation for the Malaita families–not 
paid by Bougainville or Papua New Guinea, 
but by Western Province, because of fear of 
Malaitan reprisals. Some victims may have been 
compensated, but even more victims have been 
created and the guilty go free.49 
Moral permission too has been given by 
politicians and sometimes public servants who 
have pillaged the public coffers, siphoned off 
potential government revenue, or accepted 
‘gifts and favours’ for their own use. These 
men do not inspire respect among the non-
beneficiaries and among those who, during the 
late colonial period, believed the administration 
was generally impartial and there to serve them 
as citizens. Misrule, it seemed, could pay. Yet 
dutiful public servants, and there were many, 
found their pay packets irregularly filled or non-
existent when they were laid off, and provident 
funds eroded as the economy faltered. 
In power, the corrupt still seemed to prosper, 
but prospering and prospects seemed out of 
reach for the youthful unemployed and less 
educated. To these, the least empowered on the 
urban fringe, there seemed few ways open to 
gaining a share of personal dignity. Rambo of 
video-land showed a way to power, just as the 
residual memory of the old ramo did, a way that 
seemed successful on Bougainville. 
All that was needed was a cause or, more 
correctly, an excuse to focus on a target near at 
hand that personified all that seemed to have 
gone awry in their world and to validate their 
social worth. To the Guadalcanal Revolutionary 
Army, it was the Malaitans and to the Malaita 
Eagle Force, it was the Guadalcanal people. In a 
downward spiral, once policing largely collapsed 
under calls for support from kinsmen in militias, 
fear of retribution for law enforcement has 
undone the fragile structure of the government’s 
and the people’s only enforcing institution. 
Payback and killing are creeping back into 
vogue. Blood ran, and runs still in the many 
hills and gullies of Honiara. And the stain is 
spreading throughout the isles.
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